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UP FROM MARRIAGE:  
FREEDOM, SOLITUDE, AND INDIVIDUAL 
AUTONOMY IN THE SHADOW 
OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
Catherine Powell* 
 
Whatever the theories may be of woman’s dependence on man, in the 
supreme moments of her life, he cannot bear her burdens.  Alone she goes 
to the gates of death to give life to every man that is born into the 
world. . . .  There is a solitude, which each and every one of us has always 
carried. . . .  Such is individual life. 
-Elizabeth Cady Stanton1 
 
Obergefell v. Hodges2 represents a tremendous victory for those of us 
who believe that each individual has the right to love, form bonds, and 
create families with whomever one so desires.  Through Obergefell and the 
line of cases from Griswold v. Connecticut3 and Loving v. Virginia4 
onward, the Court has now repeatedly affirmed the freedoms to plan, to 
choose, and to create one’s own family as fundamental. 
The problem with Obergefell, however, is that in the majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy’s adulation for the dignity of marriage5 risks undermining 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  For input, I am very 
grateful to Elizabeth Cooper, Clare Huntington, Joseph Landau, Ethan Leib, Robin Lenhardt, 
Darren Rosenblum, Reva Siegel, and participants in a panel discussion on equality at the 
International Society of International Law annual conference, New York University School 
of Law (July 2015).  I am also thankful to Christine Calabrese, Amanda Kane, and Devan 
Grossblatt for excellent research assistance. 
 
 1. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Congressional Judiciary Committee:  The 
Solitude of Self (January 18, 1892) (emphasis added), http://www.pbs.org/stantonanthony/ 
resources/index.html?body=solitude_self.html [http://perma.cc/L3H4-G72Q].  I would like 
to thank Reva Siegel for drawing my attention to this speech, which Stanton delivered when 
she retired at seventy-six years old as President of the National American Woman Suffrage 
Association. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion 
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhardt, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1800 (2008).  Stanton repeated this 
widely reported speech before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary and the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage in 1892, and 10,000 copies of the Congressional 
Record’s publication of it were distributed around the country. Id. 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 4. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 5. See also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (recognizing same-
sex marriage as “a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between 
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the dignity of the individual, whether in marriage or not.  Often when we 
celebrate great landmark cases, such as Obergefell, it is necessary to 
examine the dark corners of these opinions to ensure we can continue to 
“bend the arc toward justice”6 to perfect our union.7  As Justice Kennedy 
himself acknowledged, “The nature of injustice is that we may not always 
see it in our own times.”8  While I agree with most of Justice Kennedy’s 
analysis in Obergefell, aspects of his reasoning have limitations which 
signal that work has yet to be done in ensuring the liberty, equality, and 
dignity9 which the majority extols. 
 
two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal 
with all other marriages” (emphasis added)). 
 6. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference:  Where Do We Go From Here? (August 16, 1967), http://kingencyclopedia. 
stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/where_do_we_go_from_here_delivered_at_the_
11th_annual_sclc_convention/ [http://perma.cc/9LWP-FZDA].  In proclaiming that “the arc 
of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice,” id., Martin Luther King, Jr. was 
quoting the nineteenth century abolitionist and Unitarian minister, Theodore Parker. See 
Jamie Stiehm, Oval Office Rug Gets History Wrong, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/03/AR2010090305100. 
html [http://perma.cc/4PUV-TQEN]. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (beginning “[w]e, the People of the United States, in Order to 
form a more perfect Union”).  More recently, President Obama has used variations of the 
phrase “perfect our union” in numerous speeches dating back to his 2008 presidential 
campaign. See, e.g., Senator Barack Obama, Address to the National Constitution Center in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:  A More Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www. 
politico.com/news/stories/0308/9100.html [http://perma.cc/3M5P-5ABC]; David Nakamura, 
Obama on Same-Sex Marriage Ruling:  ‘We Have Made Our Union a Little More Perfect’, 
WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 
2015/06/26/obama-on-same-sex-marriage-ruling-we-have-made-our-union-a-little-more-
perfect/ [http://perma.cc/7V2M-RXTH]. 
 8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 9. While Justice Kennedy does not provide a definition of dignity, note that the 
meaning of dignity is “famously contested.” Siegel, supra note 1, at 1799.  Side stepping the 
various debates about “dignity” as a concept, this Essay instead takes as its central focus the 
notion of individual “autonomy” and explores the value of situating individual autonomy 
within marriage by drawing on the theory of relational autonomy. See infra note 26 and 
accompanying text.  For discussion and critique of the dangers and risks of 
constitutionalizing “dignity,” see, for example, Catharine MacKinnon, Sex Equality in 
Global Perspective 4 (Oct. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(“[R]educing [the] injury [of sex inequality] to the feeling of indignity in the subordinated 
person makes it all mental and within the unequally treated person, which tends to cover up, 
even trivialize, the coercive and injurious external conditions and systemic acts usually 
involved, the material deprivations and physical harms inflicted by dominant groups, along 
with the resources and status they benefit from.”); Katherine Franke, “Dignity” Could Be 
Dangerous at the Supreme Court, SLATE (June 25, 2015), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/outward/2015/06/25/in_the_scotus_same_sex_marriage_case_a_dignity_rationale_cou
ld_be_dangerous.html [http://perma.cc/93GH-3HUL].  Franke criticizes Justice Kennedy’s 
reliance on dignity, because of the way it can rebound, as “[d]ignity does its work by shifting 
stigma from one group to . . . other groups who, by contrast, are not deserving of similar 
ennoblement.  These others include ‘less-deserving’ groups like unmarried mothers, the 
sexually ‘promiscuous,’ or those whose relationships don’t fit the respectable form of 
marriage.” Franke, supra. But see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 749 (2011) (“The introduction of a[n] . . . overarching term like ‘dignity’ that 
acknowledges the links between liberty and equality is overdue.”). 
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In exalting “the transcendent importance of marriage” throughout “the 
annals of human history,” Justice Kennedy opines “[i]ts dynamic allows 
two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage 
becomes greater than just the two persons.”10  Observing “[t]he centrality of 
marriage to the human condition,” Justice Kennedy proclaims that “[t]he 
lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and 
dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.”11  The 
shortcoming in Justice Kennedy’s otherwise appropriate celebration of 
marriage is that it obscures the dignity of the individual, whether married or 
not. 
The flaw in Justice Kennedy’s analysis is most clearly revealed in a 
particularly shortsighted statement, in which Justice Kennedy writes, 
“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out 
only to find no one there.”12  This observation ignores the fact that in the 
end, we are each all alone—for marriage is always contingent.13  After all, 
“singleness includes everyone at some point, even those who are married:  
love ends; spouses cheat; someone dies first.”14  In fact, single Americans 
are now more than half the U.S. population.15  Indeed, “To be in a marriage, 
no matter how strong, is always a precarious condition, which means that 
the [presumed] dignity [of marriage] you’ve been given can be taken away 
at any moment.”16 
In fact, there is nothing shameful nor undignified in solitude.  Indeed, 
solitude—and comfort within solitude—is a necessary condition for 
individual fulfillment as, in the process of “tak[ing] counsel with [oneself] 
in solitude,” one can learn to reach one’s highest potential.17  It is little 
wonder, then, that the U.S. approach to constitutional rights is primarily 
based on individual liberty, for it is the basic building block for securing 
human dignity (1) in our lives alone with ourselves, (2) within marriage, (3) 
 
 10. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593–94. 
 11. Id. at 2594. 
 12. Id. at 2600. 
 13. To be fair, Justice Kennedy, in passing, recognizes the contingent nature of marriage 
in noting that “[i]t offers the hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that 
while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.” Id. at 2600 (emphasis 
added). 
 14. Michael Cobb, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/opinion/the-supreme-courts-lonely-hearts-club. 
html?ref=opinion&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/S5GW-K27Q]; see id. (“I started to wonder how 
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan—two of the most high-profile single women in 
the federal government—felt as they reviewed and had to join Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion . . . .”). 
 15. Rich Miller, Single Americans Now More than Half the U.S. Population, CHI. TRIB. 
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-single-americans-
population-20140910-story.html [http://perma.cc/79PW-PV9T]. 
 16. Cobb, supra note 14. 
 17. William Deresiewicz, Lecture at the United States Military Academy at West Point:  
Solitude and Leadership (Oct. 2009), https://theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-
leadership/#.Vb-4WPldsXg [http://perma.cc/9WVL-A775]. 
72 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
within other relations (including with our children), and (4) within society 
and our relationship with the state.18 
Yet throughout the opinion, Justice Kennedy elides the individual and the 
married couple.19  He also obscures the right to marry (or not) with the right 
to marriage.20  This conflates, on the one hand, the negative duty of the 
state not to interfere in individual rights to exercise the freedom to marry 
(or not), and, on the other hand, any positive obligation of the state to 
support affirmatively individual rights to marry and the institution of 
marriage.  The opinion leaves me wondering where sovereignty lies.  Was 
Justice Kennedy’s intention to empower the individual in the exercise of 
“self-sovereignty”21 in making choices surrounding one’s association and 
family?  Was he seeking to empower the sovereignty of the family?22  Or 
was Justice Kennedy’s objective to define limits on the sovereignty of the 
state in determining which associations (i.e., marriages) it can recognize or 
not?  Or was he aiming at all three? 
Justice Kennedy’s celebration of the married couple over the solitary 
individual is especially problematic because it overlooks—and even 
implicitly undermines—the importance of individual autonomy and the 
importance of solitude in defining and refining individual autonomy.  In 
fact, individual autonomy empowers the choices we make, including 
decisions about with whom we associate.  Marriage itself has evolved from 
being an arrangement of political power (in ancient times where rulers 
married off their daughters for political power), to economic power (in the 
 
 18. Implicitly, Justice Kennedy recognizes this in the way he organizes a key part of his 
opinion around four “principles and traditions” demonstrating that “the reasons marriage is 
fundamental under the Constitution” are that the right to personal choice in marriage 
supports:  (1) “individual autonomy,” (2) “a two-person union unlike any other,” (3) 
“children and families,” and (4) “a building block of our national community.” Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2599–601. 
 19. See, e.g., id. at 2599 (“[T]he right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”); id. at 2600 
(“The right to marry thus dignifies couples who ‘wish to define themselves by their 
commitment to each other.’” (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 
(2013))); id. (“[W]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” 
(quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2005))). 
 20. For a critique of this, see Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 41, 41–42 (2015).  As Leib notes, commentators “saw that the slippage between the 
right to marry and the right to marriage long before Obergefell provided reason to revisit the 
question.” Id. at 42 n.4 (citing Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
667, 685–89 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081 
(2005)). 
 21. For an elaboration of the concept of “self-sovereignty” (in the context of 
reproductive rights for women), see Siegel, supra note 1, at 1797–800. 
 22. As John Locke indicated, families can be seen as small governing structures, as 
“[t]he first society was between man and wife.” JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT 39 (J. Gough ed., 1947).  In dissent in Obergefell, Justice Thomas points to 
this Lockean notion of family, but Justice Thomas does so to argue that, at the founding, the 
“right to engage in the very same activities that petitioners have been left free to engage in—
mak[e] vows, hold[] religious ceremonies celebrating those vows, [and] rais[e] 
children . . . was understood to predate government, not to flow from it.” Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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era of husbands as breadwinners and wives as caregivers), to love and self-
expression in the twenty-first century.23  In a sense, marriage has become 
an extension of the self, a way to amplify and enhance selfhood and self-
sovereignty. 
Realizing self-sovereignty has been particularly important for women’s 
empowerment, as the Elizabeth Cady Stanton quote at the start of this Essay 
reflects.24  Given the long history of inequality women have experienced 
and continue to experience in marriage, families, and society more broadly, 
recognizing the self-sovereignty and independence of women is essential 
for gender equality, specifically, and human dignity, more generally. 
It is thus essential to interrogate further the fact that, in elevating the 
dignity of marriage over the autonomy of individuals, Justice Kennedy 
muddles the connections between both (1) the individual and collective 
interests at stake, and (2) the government’s negative and affirmative 
obligations toward marriage, the individuals within marriage, and 
individuals within other family structures.  While Justice Thomas picks up 
on the dichotomy between the negative and positive duties of the state,25 
my approach to the validity of the dichotomy is quite different from his in 
that my view is that, in addition to having a duty not to interfere in the 
individual’s exercise of rights, the state should also play an affirmative role 
to support both relationships and individuals (and my bottom line on the 
same-sex marriage question is the same as the majority’s, even on the more 
narrow understanding that the government is strictly limited to the negative 
obligations of the night watchman state). 
As a vehicle for mediating our relationships with each other and the state, 
marriage is akin to a form of governance that needs to be disaggregated to 
better understand (1) how individual rights, autonomy, and choices can be 
enhanced (inside and outside marriage) even as we value the associational 
dimensions of rights, and (2) how we might think more expansively about 
the scope of the government’s duties in supporting individual choices, 
conduct, and experiences within and beyond the governing units of the 
family and the state. 
I.  INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY IN RELATION TO OTHERS 
While Justice Kennedy collapses the individual and collective interests at 
stake in ways that diminish the value of solitude, his analysis can be better 
understood (and strengthened) if we flip the analysis and evaluate marriage 
from the standpoint of relational autonomy.26  In other words, as 
 
 23. STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY:  FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY, OR 
HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 11 (2005). 
 24. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 25. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632–637 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 26. For further discussion, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS:  A RELATIONAL 
THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND THE LAW (2011).  In discussing relational autonomy, 
Nedelsky explains that rather than view autonomy in an “asocial atomistic image of the self-
made man[,] many contemporary philosophers of autonomy . . . gravitate toward relational 
or intersubjective accounts of autonomy.” Id. at 9 (quoting MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, 
GENDER, POLITICS (2003)). 
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individuals, we obviously do not make choices in isolation with regard to 
intimate companions, other associates, and the state; rather, these 
relationships also shape and inform who we are and how we experience our 
autonomy. 
Justice Kennedy might have distinguished the individual and collective 
interests at stake in marriage27 because there are not only historic but also 
ongoing inequalities within marriages—particularly between breadwinners 
and caregivers.28  Relationships between breadwinners and caregivers 
within marriage are often based on relative power, dominance, and 
subordination.  Federal law not only fails to address, but, if anything, 
possibly facilitates unequal division of household responsibilities.29  For 
example, for married couples with a “wage-earning spouse” (typically a 
man) and a “stay-at-home spouse” (typically a woman), federal tax law 
provides a marriage “bonus,” in that the couple pays less in total taxes than 
they would if they were single; for a married couple whose salaries are 
more equal, however, federal tax law provides a marriage “penalty.”30 
Once we understand that we fundamentally exist in relation to others, we 
recognize that we become autonomous with others—with parents, teachers, 
spouses, employers, and the state—even as we are embedded within 
relationships of power.31  Autonomy can therefore be understood as a 
capacity that can be nurtured or undercut in life through the relationships 
and the societal structures we inhabit.32 
Even though the U.S. Bill of Rights is founded on individual rights, we 
often exercise these rights in association with others, such as with the right 
to assemble.  But in recognizing the freedom to exercise these associational 
rights—to speak, to assemble, to organize politically with others, to share 
intimate relationships and procreate with one another—the U.S. 
constitutional text and jurisprudence place individual choice and autonomy 
at the center.  The right to be oneself—on one’s own terms and with 
 
 27. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–06. 
 28. For an excellent early discussion that captures the theory of how same-sex marriage 
could be sought as a means to disrupt traditional structures of gender and power within 
marriage and family law, see generally Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender:  A 
Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9 (1991).  
 29. See Deborah Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 
749–51, 753–55 (2012). 
 30. See Deborah Widiss, Marriage Policy Encourages One Spouse to Stay Home and 
the Other to Work:  How Will This Affect Same-Sex Couples As They Gain More and More 
Legal Rights?, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/ 
2013/06/marriage-policy-encourages-one-spouse-to-stay-home-and-the-other-to-
work/276566/ (“Even federal welfare programs encourage a breadwinner-caretaker divide 
for married couples, by imposing work requirements on families collectively, so that it 
makes sense for one parent to work and the other to provide childcare. (In fact, if both 
parents work, they likely would exceed income eligibility).”) [http://perma.cc/594F-ABUU].  
It is not clear to what extent the gender asymmetry in caregiving-breadwinning roles is 
shaped by legal frameworks and “how much it stems from societal norms regarding feminine 
and masculine roles,” but “[s]ame-sex marriage can serve as a natural experiment to help 
tease these factors apart.” Id. 
 31. NEDELSKY, supra note 26, at 3–5. 
 32. Id. 
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whomever one chooses—is itself a fundamental form of individual liberty.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Lawrence v. Texas,33 at the core of 
liberty “is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”34  But implicit in Lawrence 
is the idea that autonomy as individuals is developed by, exercised in, and 
shaped by our associations, particularly our intimate associations. 
A few simple examples serve to illustrate this point.  First, consider that 
each of us often becomes our truest selves in the course of talking with a 
close friend, lover, or partner.  “This is what we call thinking out loud, 
discovering what you believe in the course of articulating it.”35  Second, 
consider studies that suggest marriage helps individuals—particularly men 
—live longer.36  Our associations with others can help us be the best 
versions of ourselves.  Finally, consider one survey suggesting that while 
parents are more sleep deprived, exercise less, and have less time for 
entertainment than nonparents, parents are “happier” based on the rewards 
and fulfillment of parenting.37  These considerations demonstrate that 
humans are social creatures and that our relationships shape our sense of 
self and our “autonomy.” 
While U.S. constitutional rights are framed in terms of rights that belong 
to individuals, the right to marriage obviously has associational dimensions.  
Justice Kennedy essentially merges individual and shared rights of married 
couples when he speaks of “the liberty of same-sex couples” and the “denial 
to same-sex couples of the right to marry” before concluding that “[t]he 
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right 
to marry.”38  Who is the rights-holder here?  At points, he treats the rights 
of the individual more distinctly from the rights of the married couple as a 
unit, in, for example, stating that “the right to marry is a fundamental right 
inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex 
 
 33. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 34. Id. at 562 (striking down Texas’s anti-sodomy law and noting “[l]iberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct”). 
 35. Deresiewicz, supra note 17. 
 36. Melaina Juntti, Does Marriage Help You Live Longer?, MEN’S J. (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.mensjournal.com/health-fitness/exercise/does-marriage-helps-you-live-longer-
20140610 (“Marriage is both a cause and a consequence of good health . . . .  Research 
shows that healthier people are more likely to get married in [the] first place and less likely 
to divorce.  However, while this is definitely part of the equation, most of these studies 
suggest that marriage also causes good health and improves overall well-being—especially 
for men.” (quoting RAND Corporation sociologist Michael Pollard)) [http://perma.cc/ 
E5VM-6846]. 
 37. See John Dick, Hands Down, People Without Kids Have Better Lives—Except for 
This One Major Thing, QUARTZ (Sept. 11, 2014), http://qz.com/262645/people-without-kids-
live-better-than-parents-on-all-fronts-except-one/ (“[M]aybe joy indeed doesn’t just have to 
come from extrinsic things and fabulous social lives—it can come from the adventure of 
raising a family, from teaching and nurturing others, from sacrifice, and from unconditional 
love.”) [http://perma.cc/N3X8-KM6R]. 
 38. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05. 
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may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”39  A relational autonomy 
standpoint may create a useful bridge to understand the ways in which these 
distinct sets of interests are interrelated. 
II.  THE INDIVIDUAL IN RELATION TO THE STATE 
Justice Kennedy also collapses the notion of negative and positive duties 
of the state.  Justice Thomas criticizes this, noting that since U.S. rights are 
based on the Lockean negative rights paradigm,40 there is no obligation of 
the state to affirmatively recognize same-sex marriage.41  The state merely 
needs to abide by its negative obligation not to interfere with liberty, for 
example, by criminally prosecuting couples.42  However, from a relational 
autonomy standpoint, the project of securing rights should not only be to 
protect the individual from the state and keep the state out, but also to use 
law to construct relations with the state that enhance autonomy.43 
Even so, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that the 
state owes affirmative duties to individuals.44  In fact, supporting a 
“positive” duty, for example, to provide welfare benefits to married 
couples, is actually not materially or conceptually different (nor does it 
necessarily require greater affirmative government outlays) from the 
“negative” duty of the state not to interfere in the classic right to liberty.45  
The classic right to liberty requires actively and affirmatively supporting the 
cost of a police force, of a judicial system, and of the right to counsel for 
indigent defendants.  To use Justice Thomas’s example of Loving v. 
Virginia—in his claim that liberty is merely a negative duty46—protecting 
the Lovings from criminal prosecution for marrying actually required an 
expansive system comprising police, judges, lawyers, courthouses, and the 
entire apparatus of the rule of law to defend their right to marry. 
Contrary to Justice Thomas’s stingy view of the role of the state, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledges a positive role for the federal government, given 
the “constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage”47—
 
 39. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added). 
 40. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2–3 (1990). 
 41. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. 
 43. NEDELSKY, supra note 26, at 71. 
 44. See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760–62 (2005) (noting no 
affirmative obligation of law enforcement to respond to request for assistance in domestic 
violence dispute that resulted in the deaths of the couple’s children); DeShaney v. 
Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1989) (noting the State’s 
failure to protect an individual against private violence generally does not constitute a 
violation of the Due Process Clause because the Clause imposes no duty on the State to 
provide members of the general public with adequate protective services). But see HENRY 
SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:  SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35–40 (2d ed. 
1996).  I am grateful to Jeremy Waldron for bringing this point to my attention. 
 45. Catherine Powell, Introduction:  Locating Culture, Identity, and Human Rights, 30 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 203 n.5 (1999) (citing Henry Shue, supra note 44). 
 46. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2636–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 2601.  Justice Kennedy notes that these benefits include “taxation; inheritance 
and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; 
hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of 
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which is a basis upon which the Court finds it is unfair to deny same-sex 
couples the right to marry.  Justice Kennedy, of course, does not reach the 
question as to whether it is fair to limit these benefits to married couples, as 
opposed to other, nonmarried couples or even to individuals. 
As other scholars have noted,48 the Obergefell (and related) litigation 
comes up short because rather than seek state-sanctioned marriage, 
marriage equality activists could have sought to have the state extend the 
constellation of benefits that belong to marriage to other types of 
relationships.  But rather than advocating for new forms of governance, 
they asked to be governed by the rules that already exist.  Thus, as Michael 
Cobb notes: 
 And so old questions remain:  Why can’t I put a good friend on my 
health care plan?  Why can’t my neighbor and I file our taxes together so 
we could save some money, as my parents do?  If I failed to make a will, 
why is it unlikely a dear friend would inherit my estate? . . .  It’s because 
I’m not having sex with those people.49 
Kennedy describes marriage as “a keystone of our social 
order . . . ‘without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.’”50  He claims marriage is “a great public institution, giving 
character to our whole civil polity”51 and that marriage equality is essential 
because of the desire “not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded 
from one of civilization’s oldest institutions.”52  Yet in “[f]ounding your 
dignity on something as flimsy and volatile as a sexual connection insures 
[sic] dignity’s precariousness as it enshrines your inherent unworthiness as 
a single individual.”53 
Beyond undercutting the individual autonomy of those who are single or 
who chose other forms of coupling beyond marriage, locating the 
constellation of benefits in marriage is also problematic because marriage is 
“a bourgeois institution that is . . . out of reach for many poor people,”54 
particularly for individuals who lack the resources, education, and social 
capital necessary to attract a mate and start a family.55  Of course, 
recognizing that same-sex couples should have equal access to the package 
of benefits linked to marriage is based on formal equality and simple 
 
survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance 
restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, 
and visitation rules.” Id.  Justice Kennedy goes on to point out that marriage recognized 
under state law “is also a significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law.” Id. 
(citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690–91 (2013), which struck down the 
Defense of Marriage Act for restricting federal recognition of marriage as between a man 
and a woman and thus had the effect of denying federal benefits to same-sex couples). 
 48. See, e.g., NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 142–43 (2008). 
 49. See Cobb, supra note 14. 
 50. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1988)). 
 51. Id. (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213). 
 52. Id. at 2608. 
 53. Cobb, supra note 14. 
 54. Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 44 (2015). 
 55. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS 13–20 (2014). 
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justice.  But marriage equality should also pave the way to reimagine how 
we can support the plural forms of family life56 that constitute and enrich 
society—as well as the individuals who comprise it. 
CONCLUSION 
In affirming liberty and equality for same-sex marriage, Obergefell is 
undoubtedly a victory deserving of celebration for the ways it moves 
freedom, autonomy, and equality forward.  However, as other 
commentators note, the decision and litigation strategy that secured this 
landmark decision fail to address both (1) the inequality within marriage, 
and (2) the inequality between marital and nonmarital relationships. 
This Essay has sought to address these shortcomings in ways that other 
commentators have missed by using the concept of relational autonomy to 
suggest ways Obergefell might lay the groundwork for future battles.  First, 
I suggest that it is precisely because Justice Kennedy obscures the 
distinction between the individual and collective interests at stake in 
marriage that the opinion under-theorizes and fails to adequately engage the 
ongoing problem of equality within marriage.57  Nonetheless, while 
convoluted, in merging the individual and collective interests at stake, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion may actually help us understand that enhancing 
the autonomy and power of individuals is itself in part based on supporting 
the relationships individuals have with each other and the state.  Because 
marriage is built on gendered relationships of power, Obergefell should 
prompt us to reimagine how the legalization of same-sex marriage can 
disrupt the way power tracks gender and gendered expectations—not only 
in same-sex marriage, but for the institution of marriage overall.58 
Second, in glossing over the extent to which the government’s obligation 
toward marriage is based on a negative or positive rights paradigm, Justice 
Kennedy fails to acknowledge the degree to which the liberty, equality, and 
dignity values upon which the opinion is based may also call for similar 
government obligations toward nonmarital relationships as well as single 
individuals.  At the same time, by blurring the negative/positive dichotomy 
line, Justice Kennedy’s opinion points the way for us to challenge the 
dichotomy between the negative and affirmative obligations the state owes 
to individuals. 
Even if our Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence does not progress 
to use the notion of relational autonomy to secure greater equality within 
families and between different types of family structures, our politics and 
policies should. 
 
 56. See generally POLIKOFF, supra note 48. 
 57. Justice Kennedy only addresses the problem of inequality within marriage in a 
couple passing references to the historical subordination of women within marriage. See 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 58. Cf. Hunter, supra note 28, at 12 (“New discursive terms could communicate that 
legalization of lesbian and gay marriage is not only a rights claim by a particular minority, 
but part of a much broader effort to subvert a social system of gender-based power 
differentials.”). 
